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Abstract:
Despite a number of changes in the leaderships of the Indonesian Bank
Restructuring Agency (IBRA) and in the policy approaches adopted by the country to
restructure the banking sector, the progress has been less than impressive. This
study shows that that the selection of policy measures adopted by the monetary
authorities during the post-1997 financial crisis, has adversely affected the
performance of the restructured banks. In particular, the high domestic interest rate
policy adopted to stabilize the local currency and to keep a tight growth of base
money has not been an effective one. Instead, this policy has arguably raised the
cost of bank restructuring in the country.
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1. Introduction
The impact of the 1997 financial crisis on the economic activities of the East
Asian economies proved to be considerably more severe than expected, both
reflecting and revealing weaknesses in domestic financial and corporate institutions,
and inappropriate government policies. Output in the most affected economies of
Southeast Asia fell by more than 6 percent in 1998 (Figure 1).  At the outset of the
crisis, external borrowings, particularly by the private sector, have often been cited
as one of the key factors responsible for the severity of the recent crisis (Bhagwati
(1998), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), Rajan and Siregar (2002) and Kawai
(2002)).  In Indonesia, corporations were the principle borrowers from foreign
sources, while in South Korea, banks were the primary borrowers from the external
markets.
Despite the varieties in the patterns of borrowings among the crisis effected
economies in East Asia, the combination of rigid exchange rate policies and high
domestic interest rate policy was inarguably an important factor for massive offshore
borrowings by the domestic financial institutions, particularly in late 1980s and early
1990s. The predominantly US dollar-pegged policy in East Asia was considered as
an implicit government guarantee that there will be no sharp changes in the nominal
exchange rate of the local currencies against the US dollar. Given the low risk
premium in the foreign exchange market, the higher returns from the domestic bank
deposits had led to an increase in deposits from non-residents and the countries￿
citizens based overseas. Krugman (1998) points out further that the implicit
guarantees on the exchange rate level and poor regulation on the financial and
corporate institutions encourage the ￿Pangloss￿ investments.
1
To deal with the economic crisis, a number of recovering programs have
been drafted and signed jointly by the government of Indonesia and the International
                                                
1  Pangloss investment are those that are undertaken based on th returns under ideal
circumstances, not on the actual project￿s expected returns.4
Monetary Fund (the IMF) since late 1997.
2  As expected, restructuring the banking
sector is among the most urgent challenges facing Indonesia during the post-1997
crisis. Despite the developments of other financial institutions, such as the capital
market and the non-banking financial institutions, the dependence of the private
sector on the domestic banking sector has always been very high in the country
(Pangestu and Habir (2002)).  Most firms, particular small and medium-sized
enterprises, continue to rely on the domestic financial institutions. To oversee the
restructuring programs of the banking sector, the Indonesian Banking Restructuring
Agency (IBRA) was established in January of 1998.
Other cornerstones of the agreements between the IMF and the government
of Indonesia include efforts to stabilize the domestic currency and to adopt a tight
monetary policy (Soesastro and Basri (1998) and Johnston (1998)). These two
programs are recognized to be particularly critical to deal with inflationary pressures
in the country during the crisis period (Siregar and Rajaguru (2002)). The tight
monetary policy program specifically requires the government of Indonesia to limit
the growth rate of its broad monetary aggregate (M2), to be achieved through
controlling base money (M0) quarterly growths. Given the limited choices of
monetary policy instruments, the central bank of Indonesia has largely resorted to a
high interest rate policy to achieve those targets of stable rupiah and base money
during most of the post-crisis period.
However, despite a number of changes in the leaderships of the IBRA and in
the policy approaches adopted by the country to restructure the banking sector, the
progress has been less than impressive.
3  In its recent report on Indonesia, IMF
(2002) underscores four key factors that explain the low asset recovery rates under
                                                                                                                                           
2 The first three Letters of Intents (LOIs) between the government of Indonesia and the
International Monetary Fund were signed in October 1997, January 1998 and March 1998.
3 As of the end 2001, IBRA￿s chairmanship has been changed at least seven times since its
establishment in 1998.5
the management of the IBRA: (a) the high degree of impairment of transferred non-
performing loan assets; (b) overvaluation of pledged shareholder assets when
originally transferred to IBRA; (c) weaker conditions in Indonesia￿s financial and
property markets than originally anticipated; and (d) depreciation of assets since they
were transferred to IBRA, in part due to poor management of these assets by IBRA.
The report also stresses the fact that the IBRA has had only limited success in
enforcing its claims through the courts or by using its quasi-judiacial powers. By end
of 2001, IBRA had processed 2,400 litigation cases, of which 2,125 cases were
through civil courts while 68 cases were brought to the bankruptcy court.  Of the
total, only 230 were settled as of end 2001, with IBRA mostly on the losing side (IMF
(2002)).
4
  In addition to those key factors above, this study will show that that the
selection of policy measures adopted by the monetary authorities during the post-
1997 financial crisis, has also adversely affected the performance of the restructured
banks, and thus further deteriorated the face values of the assets. In particular, we
will show that the high domestic interest rate policy adopted to stabilize the local
currency and to keep a tight growth of base money has not been an effective
measure. Instead, this policy has arguably worsened the environment for reforms
and raised the cost of the banking restructuring.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Next section will briefly highlight the
high cost of bank restructuring in Indonesia. Section three discusses and analyses
recent trends and policy debates on the three key monetary indicators (the domestic
interest rate, the nominal exchange rate of rupiah against the US dollar and the base
money).  Empirics are presented in section four to investigate the effectiveness of
the interest rate policy in achieving its objectives of stable rupiah and base money.
                                                                                                                                           
4 For cases brought by IBRA against Top 21 obligors, as of mid-February 2002, IBRA had won
7 out of 25 of the cases in bankruptcy court, and none of the four cases in civil court (IMF
(2002, pg.42).6
Section five presents evidences of adverse consequences of the interest rate policy
on selected performance indicators of the restructured banks. Brief concluding
remarks end the paper.
2. Brief Notes on Financing Bank Restructuring in Indonesia
5
By the end of 2001, IBRA was reported to have received assets (of
restructured banks) with a face value of roughly Rp550 trillion, or around 43 percent
of the country￿s GDP in 2000 (IMF (2002)). Receipts from the management and
disposal of the assets sales will help to offset the 703 trillion rupiah (55 percent of
the GDP in 2000) in public sector debt issued towards recapitalising Indonesia￿s
banks.
Out of this total amount of domestic bond issued, approximately Rp435 trillion
is in the form of bank recapitalisation bonds (Table 1). Roughly around 65 percent of
the total recapitalised bonds are spent to deal with bad loans in the state banks.
While only about 4 percent was channelled to the private banks. Furthermore, it is
important to note that almost 70 percent of the total recapitalised bonds were
disbursed into 11 main domestic banks (4 state banks and 7 private banks) (Table
1b).
In addition to financing the bonds, the government of Indonesia had also
committed itself to provide ￿a blanket guarantee￿ on all deposits and liabilities of
national banks (other than shareholders￿ funds and subordinated debt) for an initial
period of two years in January 27, 1998. This measure had to be taken to deal with
depositor panic and international banks not accepting letters of credits issued by
                                                                                                                                           
5 Numerous studies and reports have highlighted the details of the restructuring processes of
the banking sector in Indonesia, such as Johnson (1998), McLeod (2000), Enoch et.al. (1999)
, and Pangestu and Habir (2002) to name a few. Given those early studies, this section will
only summarize few key policies. The objective of this section is to highlight the heavy cost of
the restructuring programs undertaken by the country.7
Indonesian banks. The provision of this high cost policy however went beyond the
initial two years target. Only in August 2002, the government revealed its plan to
phase out the blanket guarantees (Table 2). According to the plan, the first stage of
implementation will be effective in the middle of 2003, six months after its formal
announcement of the target start date.
3. Base Money, Exchange Rate and Interest Rate
3.1. Base Money
On November 1, 1997, the day after the first IMF agreement was signed, the
government of Indonesia announced the liquidation of 16 banks. Although the
decision had already been foreshadowed, it created shock waves that resulted in a
total loss of confidence in the banking system (Soesastro and Basri (1998)). One of
the aftermaths of the closure of the banks was the rise in the levels of monetary
aggregates during the last few months of 1997 and first seven months of 1998. The
expansion reflected the liquidity support provided to troubled banks and the impact of
depositor runs on banks. The consequence of the banking sector bailouts prompted
an increasing use of seigniorage, and would eventually require infusions of liquidity
to prevent systemic runs.
Within a month after the announcement of the closures of the 16 banks, the
level of base money has grown by more than 36%. By the end of July 1998, the base
money had experienced an unprecedented increase of more than 115% from its
level in November 1997 (Figure 2). For the sake of comparison, between 1991 and
1996, the annual growth rate of base money in Indonesia had been averaging only
around 25%, with the highest growth in 1996 at 38% and the lowest in 1991 at
around 15%.
3.2. Rupiah: To Float or Not To Float8
In August 1997, the monetary authority of Indonesia floated rupiah and
immediately the Indonesian currency experienced around 16.8% depreciation
against the US dollar (Figure 3). However, the worst fall occurred only in the first six
months of 1998. Right after being floated in August 1997, the nominal exchange rate
was at Rp3,035 per 1US dollar. By June1998, the local currency was traded at 1US
dollar for Rp14,900.  Corsetti et.al (1999) argue that the nominal depreciations of
Asian currencies in 1997 were in fact consistent with the expected inflationary
consequences of banking and financial bailouts.
In addition to the massive depreciations, the uncertainties and the volatilities
of rupiah had further worsened the economic condition during the crisis. The spread
between the buying and the selling rate of rupiah against the US dollar has widened
from Rp100 during the first few months of 1997 to more than Rp1500 on February of
1998, reflecting the rise in the risk premium of holding rupiah (Figure 4). Despite the
return of political stability in late 2001, the spread rate continued to be wider than the
pre-crisis rate.
Another most commonly used measurement to evaluate the uncertainties in
the foreign exchange market is the volatility index. To estimate the volatility rates of
rupiah, we employ different types of ARCH models. The GARCH specification that
we consider takes the form:
  t t t e NER a a NER + + = − 1 1 0 ln ln , where:  ) , 0 ( ~ t t h N e (1)
  t t t t u h e h + + + = − − 1
2
1 γ β α .              (2)
() t LnNER is the nominal exchange rate of rupiah against the US dollar in the
log-form. The conditional variance equation (Equation.2) described above is a
function of three terms: (1) the mean α ; (2) news about volatility from the previous
period, measured as the lag of the squared residual from the mean equation: 
2
1 − t e9
(the ARCH term); and (3) the last periods forecast error variance,  1 − t h  (the GARCH
term). The test is done on daily rupiah rates from August 1, 1997 to June 12, 2002.
Many different types of ARCH models such as ARCH, GARCH and EGARCH
models were estimated on the data. However, only the GARCH(1,1) models are
found to be superior in generating the volatility for the rupiah nominal exchange rates
against the US dollar.
6 Consistent with the risk premiums captured by the spread
between the buying and the selling rate of rupiah against the US dollar, we find a
sharp rise in the volatility rate of rupiah, particularly in 1998 (Figure 5). The average
volatility rate from January 1998 to July 1998 was more than four times higher than
the average from August 1997 to December 1997. The GARCH(1,1) conditional
variance also shows that the volatility rate declined substantially starting 1999. From
January 2000 to June 2002, the average volatility rate was only one-fourth of the rate
from August 1997 to December 1997. Our test results are consistent with those of
McKinnon (2000) and Hernandez and Montiel (2001). Both of these studies have
found that after a brief adoption of a floating regime in late 1997 and early 1998,
most of the East Asian crisis-effected economies, including Indonesia, have either
gone back to the old regime of soft-US dollar pegged policy or sought to stabilize the
values of their currencies against the US dollar without adopting any of the strong
commitment mechanisms ---this strategy is known as the ￿hollow middle￿.
3.3. One-month certificate of Bank Indonesia Rate
As briefly stated in the introduction, one of the big debates on the role of
monetary policy in Indonesia during the crisis period is on the desirability of
increasing key interest rates to defend the local currency and to manage the growth
rate of the base money. At its highest level reported in August 1998, the one-month
central bank security (1-month SBI rate) rate went beyond 70 percent (Figure 6).
                                                
6 The GARCH(1,1) test results can be made available upon request to the author.10
Even by the end of the first two years of the 1997 financial crisis, the one-month SBI
rate was still hovering at the rate of more than 25 percent.  Between June 1999 and
April 2000, the one-month rate of the central bank security reported a steady decline
and reached its lowest rate at around 11 percent in April 2000. However, the rate
has reverted back to a rising trend starting June 2000. In the last 6 months of 2001,
the one-month SBI rate has reached an average level of well above 17 percent.
4. Empirics
The objective of this section is to examine the natures of the relationships
between the interest rate and the other two key monetary indicators (the exchange
rate and the base money). Given the macroeconomic variables discussed above,
there is clearly a potential circular reasoning at work. In other words, one needs to
investigate a two-way interaction between the relevant variables.
7 To overcome this
we make use of the conventional Granger-causality tests to ascertain the direction of
causation. While our interest is in whether rupiah movements and the growth rate of
base money are influenced by the changes in the key central bank interest rate, we
examine bi-directional Granger-causation for completeness. A general specification
of our test in the bi-variate context (X, Y) may be expressed as:
t i t i i i i t i t X Y Y 1 1 1 1 1 ε β α + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − = = − ∑ ∑ (3)
t i t i i i i t i t X Y X 2 1 2 1 2 ε β α + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − = = − ∑ ∑ (4)
where:  ε t is a white noise error term and ∆ is the first difference operator. All
variables are in the log-forms. The Granger-causality test examines the statistical
                                                
7 For instance, the changes in the domestic interest rate may influence the movements of
rupiah, and reciprocally, the fluctuations in the domestic currency could have played a big
factor in explaining the changes in the domestic interest rate.11
significance of the ∆ Xt  in explaining ∆ Yt  (Equation 3) and vice-versa in (Equation 4).
To ensure the appropriateness of the granger-causality test, we investigate the unit-
root properties of all three monetary variables. We find that all of them are an I(1)
series.
8
4.1. Exchange Rate and Interest Rate
Two contrasting sets of views have emerged on the effectiveness of the
interest rate policy as a stabilization tool for the domestic currency. The traditional
views argue that a tight monetary policy is necessary to support the exchange rate.
The rise in the interest rate raises the return that an investor obtains from investing
in the country, reduces capital flight and discourages speculation. In contrast, the
revisionist views claim that under the unique condition of a financial panic, tight
monetary policies and high interest rates would result in capital outflows and
exchange rate depreciation. That is high interest rate causes a financial implosion,
and raises default possibilities, thus weakening of the currency￿. (Radelet and Sachs
(1998) and Furman and Stiglitz (1998)).
Applying the Granger-Causality test (as shown in equation 3 and 4), we
investigate the effectiveness of the changes in the central bank one-month security
rate (the 1-month SBI rate) in stabilizing the fluctuations of the local currency. As
discussed before, the central bank of Indonesia has been active to try to defend
rupiah by raising its SBI rates. Given the availability of daily data on both rupiah and
one-month SBI rate, we are able to break our observations into three sets: 1.) the full
period: August 1997 - June 2002; 2.) the peak of the crisis period: August 1997 -
December 1999; and 3.) the post-crisis observation set (January 2000 - June 2002).
Having the three sub-periods, we can conclusively evaluate the effectiveness of the
                                                
8  For the sake of brevity, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test results are not posted in
the paper. However, they can be made available upon request to the author.12
interest rate policy in limiting the speculative pressures against the local currency.
The results of our tests are posted in Table 3. Three sets of lags are tested
(5 days, 15 days and 30 days)
9. Based on the full sample period and the peak of
crisis period, the test statistics robustly indicate that the changes in the SBI interest
rate did not have any significant influence on the fluctuations of the rupiah. The F-
statistics arrive to the same conclusions using all three different lags. As for the post-
crisis period, we do find evidence that the interest rate policy had significant
influence (at 10% significant level) on the fluctuations of the rupiah at 30 days lag.
However, the result is not robust as it varies when we tried different sets of lags. In
fact, when we use 5 and 15 days lag, we find the interest rate to be an insignificant
factor. In short, the interest rate policy has failed to stabilize the local currency during
the crisis. This finding supports the conclusion of Azis (2001).
10
Interestingly, the results have also shown that during the full crisis period and
at the peak of the 1997 financial crisis, the changes in rupiah have significantly
granger-caused movements in the one-month SBI rate. These findings capture the
policy respond implemented by the monetary authorities to defend the local currency
via the interest rate policy.
4.2. Interest Rate and Base Money
Another set of the Granger-Causality test is conducted to evaluate the
effectiveness of the interest rate policy in absorbing the excess base money in
Indonesia. However given the availability of monthly data only, we do not have a
large enough degree of freedoms to break the observation set into three sub-periods
                                                
9 These numbers of lags are chosen to ensure that we have enough degrees of freedom. In
any case, we experiment with other lags. But the results do not change. For the reporting
purposes, we only show the 30 days lag results.
10 Azis (2001) shows that the effectiveness of the interest rate policy depends on economic
and political risk factors in Indonesia during the 1997 financial crisis. Under high and political
risks, rising interest rates only lead to further depreciation of companies￿ values (and
investment) and trigger a higher expectation for further weakening of local currency.13
as what we have done earlier. The test result on the full sample covering the period
of August 1997 - December 2001 confirmed the ineffectiveness of the interest rate
policy as a key instrument in achieving the objective of reducing the base money
growth rate (Table 4). No significant F-statistics are reported to indicate any granger-
causality relationships between the interest rate and the base money.
5. Bank Restructuring and High Interest Rate
Preceding empirical results have convincingly shown that the active monetary
policy intervention in the foreign exchange market and in the money market through
various changes in the key SBI rates has not been effective in achieving its targets.
Obviously, one must acknowledge other factors that may have explained the
ineffectiveness of the interest policy, especially as a measure to stabilize rupiah.
Political instability and social unrests for instances have also been blamed for the
high volatility of rupiah, particularly during the height of the crisis period. However,
despite the ineffectiveness of the interest rate policy, the policy of high interest rate
lasted for most of the crisis period. Consequently, this policy has adversely impacted
the banking sector heavily.  The next sub-section will review few indicators to show
negative implications of the high interest rate on the performances of the local banks
in general.
5.1. Interest Rate Spread and Profitability.
Looking at Figure 6, it is apparent that the six-month deposit rate follows the
movement of the SBI -1 month rate more closely than the lending rate. The granger-
causality tests confirm these visual observations (Table 5). Changes in the SBI rate
had significantly granger-caused both the lending rate and the deposit rate during
the period of August 1997-December 2000. But it is clear from the F-statistics that
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the causality effect of the SBI rate is significantly stronger on the deposit rate than on
the lending rate. 
11The combination of high inflationary pressures and the rising SBI
pushed the deposit rate to increase proportionally to ensure the real interest rate to
be marginally above zero and to prevent heavy withdrawals of deposits and
conversions of rupiah to foreign currencies, particularly during the height of the
crisis. The lending/ working capital rate, on the other hand, could not rise as much to
prevent further defaults on the loans. Particularly, with rising uncertainties and
bankruptcies in key industries in the economy, most local banks had already faced a
sharp fall on the demand for working capitals. During most of the crisis period, most
of the domestic banks were not able to extend any significant amount of credits to
local firms and households due partly to the high interest cost of the loans.
Consequently, as the deposit rate exceeded the lending rate in the early
1998, the domestic banking sector in Indonesia experienced a costly period of
negative-interest rate spreads (Figure 6).
12 The rise in the deposit rate implies a
rising cost for the bank. In contrast, a higher lending rate means an increasing
interest return for the banks. From January 1998 to December 1998, the six-month
deposit rate was in average around 7 percent higher than the lending rate. In
October 1998, the negative spread was at a staggering rate of 19 percent. The
negative spread continued during the first seven months of 1999, with the average
spread rate at 2.2 percent.
In turn, the negative spreads further deteriorated the performance of the
banking sector. Overall, the banking industry in Indonesia had experienced a total
gross loss of as much as Rp178 trillion by December 1998 (Figure 7).
13 Consistent
                                                
11 We apply three different lags (1, 2 and 3 months). The overall conclusions are the same.
12 The negative spread is calculated by subtracting the deposit rate from the lending rate.
13  Given the nominal exchange rate at an average of 1US$ = Rp7,600 for the month of
December 1998, this implies that the banking sector was experiencing a total loss of around
US$ 23.4 billions (before tax).15
with the end of negative spread rates in early 2000, the banking industry started to
post positive gross profits in 2000 and 2001. Reflecting the improvement in the
profitability of the banking industry, the percentage of the gross non-performing
loans over the total loans of the banking sector improved to the level of 18 percent at
the end of 2000 from the worst level of 50 percent reported between December 1998
and March 1999 (Figure 8). 
14
6. Brief Concluding Remarks.
Claessens et.al (1999) have argued that given the problem and the level of
corporate distress, as well as the continued lack of goof governance over the
process, the recovery of the banking and corporate sectors, and therefore the
recovery of the East Asian economies will take longer time. As briefly discussed,
previous papers have highlighted other factors responsible for the slow progress in
the restructuring of problem banks in Indonesia. This study evaluated the monetary
policy adopted by the government of Indonesia, and found the high interest rate
policy, in particular, to have also hampered the progress of the bank restructuring
process.
The empirics suggest that the high interest rate policy was an ineffective
monetary instrument in dealing with both volatile local currency and rapid growth of
base money, particularly during the height of the 1997 financial crisis in 1998 and
1999. Furthermore, the high interest rate policy was responsible for the negative
interest spread that had partly caused the overall banking sector to experience a
negative profit. From the experience of Indonesia, it is clear that for the monetary
policy to be an effective recovery instrument, it must consider and incorporate other
macroeconomic objectives in the country, as well as the fragility of the banking and
                                                
14 Given the limited sample observations (and hence degrees of freedom) for the gross profit
number and the non-performing loans, we cannot do any regression tests to show statistically16
corporate sectors. Furthermore, the political supports are also crucial for any
recovery strategies to be successful.
                                                                                                                                           
that the negative spread in the interest rate has significantly influenced the performance of the
banks.17
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435.38 100.00% 180.90 219.48 35.0
State Banks
(4)
282.1 64.79% 127.1 120.01 35.0
Private Banks
(7)
17.68 4.06% 3.33 14.35
Others* 135.6 31.15% 50.47 85.12
Note: Others* includes private banks being taken over by the government, regional
development banks.
Source: Bank of Indonesia Data Base
Table 1b: Eleven Main Recapitalised Banks: Bonds and Total Assets
(in Trillion Rupiah)
State Banks Private Banks
Banks Assets Bonds Ratio
(%)*
Banks Assets Bonds Ratio
(%)*
Mandiri 232.6 181.2 78 BCA 96.9 59.6 62
BNI 114.3 61.8 54 Danamon 60.5 47.5 79
BRI 54.0 29.1 54 Niaga 17.6 9.5 54
BTN 20.5 9.8 48 BII 40.1 6.5 16
Lippo 21.8 6.0 28
Bali 5.7 5.3 94
Universal 11.3 4.2 37
Source: Dick (2001), Note: * The ratio captures the percentage share of the bonds
on the overall assets of the banks.20
Table 2: Schedule of Phase-Out of Government Blanket Guarantee
(As of August 2002)
Effective Date Type of Guarantee Items Terminated
First Stage:
6 months after its formal
announcement
1.  On Balance Sheet:
     a). Cash Collateral
     b).  Import Facilities
     c). Securities, e.g. Bonds, etc
2.  Off Balance Sheet:
     a). Import Transactions, e.g. L/C (Letter of Credits)
and standby L/C, etc.
     b). Bank Guarantee
     c). Currency Swap
     d). Local Letter of Credit
Second Stage:
12 months after
 1.  Inter-bank Loans
  2. Third Party Funds, e.g. deposits, CD, and On Call
Deposits above Rp 5 billion.
Third Stage:
18 months after
  1. Third Party Funds above Rp 100 million
  2.  Establishing Limited Deposit Insurance up to Rp
100 million.
Source: Bisnis Indonesia (daily newspaper) and Indonesian Rupiah Bond Weekly
(Citibank and Solomon Smith Barney)21
Table 3: Granger-Causality Test (Rupiah and 1-month SBI rate)
(All variables in the log-forms (ln), ∆  is the first difference operator)
I. Full Period: Daily observations, August 1997 ￿ June 2002
Null Hypothesis Observation F-Statistics Probability
∆ lnSBI doesn￿t Granger-
Cause ∆ lnrupiah
1260 (lags = 30) 0.9104 0.6064
∆ lnrupiah doesn￿t Granger-
Cause ∆ lnSBI
1260 (lags = 30) 5.4598 0.0000
II. Peak of the Crisis: Daily Observations, August 1997 ￿ December 1999
Null Hypothesis Observation F-Statistics Probability
∆ lnSBI doesn￿t Granger-
Cause ∆ lnrupiah
580 (lags = 30) 0.4886 0.9905
∆ lnrupiah doesn￿t Granger-
Cause ∆ lnSBI
580 (lags = 30) 2.7223 0.0000
III. Post-Crisis: Daily Observations, January 2000 ￿ June 2002
Null Hypothesis Observation F-Statistics Probability
∆ lnSBI doesn￿t Granger-
Cause ∆ lnrupiah
630 (lags = 30) 1.3958 0.0807
∆ lnrupiah doesn￿t Granger-
Cause ∆ lnSBI
630 (lags = 30) 1.1891 0.226922
Table 4: Granger-Causality Test (Base Money (M0) and 1-month SBI rate)
(All variables are in the log-forms (ln), ∆  is the first difference operator)
Full Period: Monthly Observations, August 1997 ￿ December 2001
Null Hypothesis Observation F-Statistics Probability
∆ lnM0 doesn￿t Granger-
Cause ∆ lnSBI
55 (lags = 3) 2.0777 0.1161
∆ lnSBI doesn￿t Granger-
Cause ∆ lnM0
55 (lags = 3) 1.3502 0.2698
Table 5: Granger-Causality Test
(1-month SBI rate, 6-month Deposit rate and Lending rate)
(All in the log-forms (ln), ∆  is the first difference operator)
Full Period: Monthly Observations, August 1997 ￿ December 2001
Null Hypothesis Observation F-Statistics Probability
∆ lnDeposit doesn￿t
Granger-Cause ∆ lnSBI
41 (lags = 3) 0.1869 0.9048
∆ lnSBI doesn￿t Granger-
Cause ∆ lnDeposit
41 (lags = 3) 11.4148 0.0000
∆ lnLending doesn￿t
Granger-Cause ∆ lnSBI
41 (lags = 3) 0.0102 0.9985
∆ lnSBI doesn￿t Granger-
Cause ∆ lnLending
41 (lags = 3) 3.5617 0.025322
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Source: CEIC Data Base23
Figure 2: Growth Rate of Base Money (Year on Year)
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Figure 3: Nominal Exchange Rate of Rupiah Against the US dollar
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Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF (various years)25
Figure 4: Spread Between Selling and Buying Exchange Rate of Rupiah Against the US dollar
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Figure 5: GARCH(1,1) Volatilty Rate of Rupiah Against the US dollar
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Note: The horizontal axis represents the daily observation starting August 1, 1997 as the first observation until June 12, 2002 exchange rate as
the last observation set. The results are based on the author￿s own calculation.27
 Figure 6: Interest Rate Spread (Working Capital Rate and 6-Month Deposit Rate) and the SBI-1 month
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Figure 7: Profit Before Tax
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Figure 8: Gross Non-Performing Loans
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